When a trusted script turns: the Optimizely attack, seen from the browser.
For about seventeen hours, visitors of news sites, software companies and retailers received malicious code from a script their sites had loaded for years. No block list could help: the code came from a trusted address. Here is what the browser itself could see.
In short
- On 16 November 2026 attackers placed a loader in the "Project JavaScript" of Optimizely Web projects. Optimizely's own CDN then served it to the visitors of about 178 organisations, among them CNN, the BBC, Fox News, Zoom and Salesforce, as reported by several security researchers.
- The loader added a script from
1688360[.]cc, a domain registered that same morning. The script swapped cryptocurrency wallet addresses, skimmed payment cards and collected cookies and screenshots; on iPhones it opened an exploit kit. - In our lab reproduction, ByteMantle recorded the script from a domain registered that day and which trusted script added it on the first page load, and put back the wallet address a visitor copied when the page swapped it.
- It also reports a card skimmer: a card number typed in the page and sent to a site that is neither the shop nor its payment provider turns the ByteMantle icon red and reaches the console. It puts back wallet addresses a script rewrites in the page's text, links and forms.
- It does not stop the skimmer's request, and it cannot see the iPhone stage. Those need controls on the website's side.
What happened
Optimizely is a widely used platform for A/B tests on websites: a site loads a small script from Optimizely's CDN, and that script carries the site's own experiment code. According to the published analyses (StepSecurity, Security Affairs, Help Net Security, BleepingComputer and others), the attack worked like this:
- The loader. Code was added to the "Project JavaScript" field of customer projects, so it travelled inside the script each site already trusted, from Optimizely's address and with Optimizely's certificate. Researchers found three forms: a plain script tag to
1688360[.]cc/track.js, the same address hidden in Base64 and decoded withatob(), and a full inline copy of the payload run throughevalin case the domain was blocked. - The domain.
1688360[.]ccwas registered at 05:23 UTC on 16 November, the day of the attack. It was suspended at 00:37 UTC on 17 November. The exposure window reported by StepSecurity is roughly 04:00 to 21:00 UTC on 16 November. - The payload. A crypto clipper that replaced valid wallet addresses with the attackers' own (in copy events, in the clipboard, in the page's text, forms and links, and in outgoing requests); a card skimmer that checked card numbers and sent them with
sendBeaconto/card.php; a collector of cookies, page addresses and screenshots; and, on Apple devices, a loader for an iOS exploit kit in a hidden frame.
BleepingComputer analysed copies of the modified Optimizely files and confirmed the injected code: some files named https://1688360[.]cc/track.js directly, others hid it in Base64 and decoded it with atob(). Salesforce said it was investigating the modifications on some of its websites and, as a precaution, had disabled Optimizely scripts across its preview and production instances.
Nothing in this list looked unusual to a site's own security tools: the first script was the familiar Optimizely script, from the familiar address.
What the browser could see
The visitor's browser is the one place where every step of this attack is visible. We rebuilt its shape in our lab, with made-up hosts and two public test addresses: a "vendor" script on a news page that adds a script from a domain registered the same day, which swaps a wallet address when the visitor copies it. With the ByteMantle extension installed:
- A script from a domain registered today. On the first page load the extension recorded that the page loaded a script from a domain 0 days old, on the page that loaded it. It is recorded as a medium threat event, not blocked: a new domain alone is a fact, not a verdict.
- Which script loaded it. The events of that page name the trusted vendor script as the one that added the new script. That is the line an investigation needs here: not "a strange script", but "the Optimizely script on this page started loading code from a domain born this morning". Which script loaded the attacker's script?
- The swapped wallet address put back. When the visitor selected an address and copied it, the page's script replaced it during the copy. ByteMantle wrote the address the visitor had selected back to the clipboard and recorded a wallet-swap event. The visitor pasted their own address.
- Addresses rewritten in the page put back. When the script changed the wallet address in the page's text, in a link and in a form field, ByteMantle put the original address back in all three and recorded the swap. The page kept working; the ByteMantle icon turned red with a short warning to check the address on the wallet.
- The card skimmer reported. On a lab checkout page, a script sent the card number typed in the payment form, hidden in Base64, with
sendBeaconto a host that was neither the shop nor a payment provider. ByteMantle recorded a critical event with the destination, the method, the encoding, the last four digits of the card and the script that sent it, and turned the icon red: "Be careful: this page sent payment card details to a site that is not the shop or its payment provider. Do not enter your card here." The same number sent to the shop's own server or to a payment provider raised nothing. The card number itself never leaves the visitor's browser.
In an organisation, the same events arrive in the ByteMantle console from every browser that met the attack, on every site where it ran. The new domain appears once in the console's Domains list, with the events of every browser that loaded it, on every site; the same domain born this morning on a news site and a retailer within the hour is not a coincidence. An analyst can add it to the organisation's threat indicators so that the rest of the fleet blocks it.
What ByteMantle would not have stopped
A browser extension sees a lot, but not everything a malicious script can do inside the page it runs in. Honestly, for this attack:
- The skimmer's request itself. ByteMantle reports the card leaving and warns the visitor, but lets the request go: a shop's checkout must keep working, and the decision to block belongs to the shop and to the security team that sees the event. Card fields in a payment provider's hosted frame (Stripe, Adyen and similar) were out of the skimmer's reach.
- Requests rewritten in the background, cookies and screenshots. Not visible as an attack from inside the page.
- The iPhone stage. ByteMantle runs in Chrome and Edge on computers, not in Safari on iOS.
What to do
- If you run a website: a strict Content Security Policy (
script-srcandconnect-srclisting only the hosts you expect) stops a script from loading code from, or sending data to, a domain nobody approved, and it is the control researchers point to for this payload. Keep payment forms in your payment provider's hosted fields. Review who can edit your third-party scripts, and audit the Optimizely project code if you use it. - If you entered a card on an affected site on 16 November: ask your bank for a new card. If you copied a wallet address there, check the address on your hardware wallet's screen before you sign anything.
- If you run a security team: look in your proxy or DNS logs for
1688360[.]ccand the IP addresses below on 16 and 17 November, and treat any browser that reached them as exposed.
Indicators
As published by StepSecurity and others; defanged.
| Indicator | What it is |
|---|---|
1688360[.]cc | payload and exfiltration host (registered 16 November 2026, suspended 17 November) |
/track.js, /html2canvas.min.js, /hit.php, /card.php | paths on that host |
webshell[.]lol | injector reported for the same actor |
136.113.106[.]136, 34.87.36[.]58, 34.96.213[.]201 | addresses reported for the attackers' servers |
Sources
How we tested
We did not use the attackers' code. The reproduction is a set of lab pages with made-up hosts: a "vendor" script that adds a second script, which swaps a copied wallet address for another and rewrites the address in the page; and a checkout page whose third-party script sends the public test card number 4111 1111 1111 1111 to another host. The domain ages are set in the lab. It checks the behaviours described above with the same extension you can install, and it runs with every ByteMantle release.
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